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THE SOMALIA INTERVENTION:  
CAN YOU NATION-BUILD IN A WHIRLWIND?

by

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## ABSTRACT

**TITLE:** The Somalia Intervention: Can You Nation-Build in a Whirlwind?

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Smith Hempstone, at the time U.S. Ambassador to Kenya, remarked when asked by the State Department to comment about getting involved in Somalia, "If you liked Beirut, you'll love Mogadishu." The international intervention into Somalia has gone through three distinct and separate phases: UNOSOM, UNITAF and UNOSOM II. Each phase involved new and expanded objectives, escalating from the purely humanitarian to a manhunt for Somalia's most recalcitrant warlord, General Mohammed Farah Aidid. In each instance, the achievements fell short of the objectives, at least from the U.N. perspective. The intervention into Somalia has revealed a unique story of a homogeneous people historically torn by a culture that prides itself on its contentiousness. As such, it has defied, and will continue to do so, the efforts of the United States and its Islamic and African sister nations to help as well as the efforts of the United Nations to rebuild Somalia into a modern state.

## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel Joel M. Peterson (M.S., SUNY-Binghamton) has been involved with U.S. military relief operations in Somalia while serving on the Headquarters, U.S. Central Command staff and as Director of Operations (J3) for OPERATION PROVIDE RELIEF based in Mombasa, Kenya. He is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and is a member of the Air War College class of 1994.

**THE SOMALIA INTERVENTION:  
CAN YOU NATION-BUILD IN A WHIRLWIND?**

**CHAPTER I**

**INTRODUCTION**

The fighting had been going on for years in the civil war in Somalia when President Siad Barre's regime was finally overthrown by opposition forces on January 27, 1991. (1:xxviii-ix) The Hawiye clan faction known as the United Somali Congress (USC) announced a provisional government in February, naming clan member Ali Mahdi Mohamed as president. (1:xxix) The former army commander, General Mohammed Farah Aidid, also a Hawiye clan group member, objected and split off to form his own faction of the USC. (1:xxix) From here the descent into total chaos accelerated.

Long before the Barre government collapsed, the military, police, militia, government ministries and institutions (including schools and health facilities) had ceased to function. The civil war had already resulted in thousands dying due to poisoned wells and slaughtered cattle. (1:xxix) By 1992 the world's humanitarian agencies had been embroiled in Somalia for years, trying to salvage what people they could. The armed robberies and assaults on relief convoys and warehouses, as well as the extortion and violence against both the population and relief workers by armed gangs, were making it harder and harder for them to make a significant difference in halting the human tragedy.

The situation in the region had been well documented and presented on television as appeals for funding donations for the various relief agencies involved. Once Cable News Network and the major television network news teams began providing an intense daily coverage of the starvation U.S. government interest in Somalia increased sharply. Although beyond the focus of this effort, a close examination of the role the media played in defining national interests and shaping national policy in regards to Somalia would be worthwhile.

In the summer of 1992, when asked to comment on the situation in Somalia, U.S. Ambassador to Kenya Smith Hempstone relayed the following warning to the State Department, "If you liked Beirut, you'll love Mogadishu. ...Inshallah, think once, twice and three times before you embrace the Somali tarbaby." (10:30) The hug came on 3 December 1992 with U.N. resolution 794 mandating the unprecedented use of force to achieve humanitarian purposes. (27:13) President George Bush ordered 28,000 U.S. troops into Somalia to escort convoys and guard relief supplies the following day. (16:5) However, as noted by the medical director for the Save the Children Fund in Somalia, after the escorted food had begun to relieve the suffering, "Starvation was one of the symptoms. That symptom is finished, but the illness is still there." (24:14)

That illness is the fact that the civil war which created the starvation problem, albeit exacerbated by drought, totally destroyed Somalia's infrastructure. (1:xxx) This, coupled with the factionalism that is a condition of Somali culture,



may make nation-building (or rebuilding in this case) an impossible task, particularly for a foreign military intervention force. (2:1; 5:61; 6:27; 29:16)

The failure to meet objectives in Somalia, whether those of the U.N. or U.S. but particularly those articulated by the U.N. Secretary-General, is the result of a lack of appreciation the cultural and social imperatives of the Somali people. Moreover, what the U.S. set as its objectives were often not what the U.N. wanted or intended, resulting in operations occasionally at cross purposes and in some cases exacerbating the conflict. This paper examines each of the three major phases of the operation. It then considers those aspects of Somali culture that inherently resist nation-building. It concludes with brief observations and comments.

## CHAPTER II

### U.N. OPERATION IN SOMALIA

The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) was created in April 1992 with the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 751. (26:13) This resolution directed the Secretary-General to send a 50-member observer team to Mogadishu to monitor the cease-fire. (26:13) Additionally, UNSCR 751 approved Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's plan to deploy a security force of approximately 500 men to Mogadishu. The security force objective was to escort humanitarian supplies to distribution centers in and around the city. (26:13) This was agreed to by

both of the warlords fighting for control of Mogadishu:  
Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and United Somali Congress  
Chairman General Mohammed Farah Aidid. (26:14)

The U.S. decided to take a unilateral step into Somalia in August 1992 by sending a joint task force (JTF PROVIDE RELIEF) to Mombassa, Kenya. Equipped with C-130 transport aircraft, JTF PROVIDE RELIEF was to assist the International Red Cross, the U.N.'s World Food Program and other relief agencies in airlifting food supplies into Somalia. The intent of these airlifts was twofold: first, to bypass the port of Mogadishu, where relief supplies arrived in great quantities but were rarely, if ever, able to be moved much beyond or at times even into the city; and second, to bypass the bandit-laden countryside where relief convoys seldom made it through intact. While flying the food directly to the district relief centers for distribution began having a significant impact on reducing the deaths by starvation, it also resulted in increased attention given to the distribution centers by the bandits and warlords.

In September 1992, U.S. airlift moved the initial U.N. security force of 550 Pakistani troops into Mogadishu. (2:37) Their objective was to escort deliveries of relief supplies to distribution centers in and around the city. (26:13) General Aidid demonstrated the duplicity of his politics when, in October, he no longer allowed the Pakistani forces to guard the airport, the piers or the food convoys and mainly confined them to their compound where they could no longer interfere

with his operations. (2:38; 22:905) Perhaps of more significance for later operations, this event prompted the Central Intelligence Agency to produce an estimate saying that General Aidid, a former Somali army commander, had the firepower and forces to keep the U.N. force where he wanted or, if need be, crush them. (22:906)

### CHAPTER III

#### UNITED TASK FORCE

A November meeting of the National Security Council's Deputies Committee decided, based on a recommendation from Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Colin Powell, that U.S. intervention was necessary. (2:38) The major reasons cited for the decision were; first, the magnitude of the loss of life in Somalia; secondly, the State Department's U.S. Agency for International Development estimate that up to 80% of the relief supplies were being stolen or diverted from their intended destinations at gunpoint; and finally, the realization that the U.S. is the only world power with the military capability to do something about it. (2:38; 13:10; 22:906)

President Bush offered the use of U.S. troops to Boutros Boutros-Ghali but insisted that they be employed only under U.S. command. (16:5) President Bush's insistence on U.S. command, combined with other nation's concerns that the U.S. not be given a free hand, required the passage of an additional resolution. (16:5) UNSCR 791 was adopted, allowing

the governments of the participating states to determine the command structure and leaving the Secretary-General and Security Council with oversight authority. (16:5) This allows the U.S. command by default. (Author's note: since United Task Force (UNITAF) was not strictly under U.N. command the name of the organization did not contain the words United Nations but rather implied it.)

UNSCR 794 rapidly followed in early December authorizing the deployment of the 30,000 troops earlier offered by President Bush. (22:905; 27:13) The resolution called for troops or money for the operation to be provided by countries in addition to the U.S. (22:905) UNSCR 794 also authorizes, "...all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia." (16:5) There is a portentous aspect to that statement. For the first time the Security Council has authorized the use of force in a nation's internal affairs. (16:5; 13:10) The ramifications of this precedent for situations like Bosnia, Sudan, Liberia, Mozambique and Zaire remains to be seen. (13:10-11; 17:22)

A significant aspect of this phase of the operation is the divergence of U.S. and U.N. objectives, with the U.S. intent on a quick, short-term operation, and the U.N. Secretary-General, who, confident he can control continued U.S. involvement, planning a long-term pacification and nation-building campaign for Somalia geared around U.S. forces. President Bush's stated objective was to "...open the

supply routes, to get the food moving, and prepare the way for a U.N. peace-keeping force to keep it moving." (16:5) An additional point the President made was that the U.S., "...will not stay in one day longer than is absolutely necessary." (16:5) Some Bush administration officials even suggested January 20, 1993 (President Clinton's inauguration) as a target date by which to have all the U.S. troops out of Somalia. (22:906) The Secretary-General, however, had other intentions for U.S. participation.

On the day U.S. troops went into Somalia, 9 December 1992, the Secretary-General recommended the U.S. stay in Somalia to disarm and pacify the warring factions and bandits throughout the country. (10:29; 11:163; 14:952; 22:906; 23:42) Specifically, he wanted the U.S. to stay until it accomplished the following: collect all the weapons, remove the mines in the north, train a military police force and restore order. (14:952) Only after U.S. forces had accomplished what he had specified would he bring in U.N. forces. (14:952) When the U.S. administration said that was not what the U.S. was going to do, Boutros-Ghali announced he would release a letter detailing, "an unwritten understanding that the U.S. would disarm and pacify Somalia." (14:952) The same day that White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater denied any U.S. pledge to disarm the Somalis, U.S. Secretary of State Eagleburger confirmed some such understanding had been reached. (14:952) The only plausible explanation for this embarrassment is a breakdown in the interagency process--a lapse in

communications somewhere between the State Department, who would make such a promise, and the Defense Department, who would have to keep the promise. Marine General Joseph Hoar of U.S. Central Command attempted to clarify this issue for Boutros-Ghali by rejecting the Secretary-General's plan, insisting that disarmament was, "...a political issue, one that needs to be settled first and foremost by the Somalis." (2:39; 14:952) General Hoar informed Washington that he did not want the task of disarming Somalia as it could involve house-to-house searches. (10:29) Critics held, however, that if U.S. troops left without "cleaning up the neighborhood," the multinational peacekeeper force could get picked to pieces. (20:50)

The Security Council had specifically allowed that U.S. forces should be withdrawn once the peace-making operation was complete and some semblance of order restored. (22:905) The peace-keeping duties would then be picked up by U.N. forces already in country. (13:5-6; 22:905) After UNITAF had declared victory, and the U.S. forces had returned home, the U.N. forces were supposed to complete disarming the warlords and bandits, create and train a Somali police force and keep everything sufficiently quiet to allow the formation of some type of national government. (19:24; 23:42)

Heavy fighting in Kismayu and other areas continually delayed the U.S. redeployment until 1 May 1993 when the UNITAF peacemakers handed over Somalia to the care of the UNOSOM II peacekeepers. (12:136; 25:13)

## CHAPTER IV

### UNOSOM II

UNSCR 814 (1993), which formed UNOSOM II, is ambitious in its intent. The Security Council, in its mandate to UNOSOM II, tasked the Secretary-General to, "provide humanitarian and other assistance to the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy and promoting political settlement and national reconciliation." (25:14)

The Council went even further in tasking UNOSOM II to:

- ...assist in relief provision and economic rehabilitation, repatriation of refugees, removal of mines, and political reconciliation and reestablishment of national and regional institutions, including Somali police.
- ...help develop appropriate public information activities.
- ...create conditions under which Somali civil society may have a role, at every level, in the process of political reconciliation and in the formulation and realization of rehabilitation and reconstructive programs. (25:14)

The United States, in Council debate, called the resolution, "an unprecedented enterprise.... The world community has been engaged to provide the most comprehensive assistance ever given to any country, with no models to guide its work." (25:14)

UNOSOM II has four military phases planned: (1) transition from UNITAF, (2) consolidation and expansion of security, (3) transfer to civilian institutions, and (4) redeployment. (25:15)

It is interesting to note that all military operations in Somalia have taken place in southern Somalia. Phase II of UNOSOM II intends to expand into northern Somalia to include Berbera and Hargeisa. (25:15) As of May 1991, the area of northern Somalia that was once British Somaliland declared its independence and formed the Republic of Somaliland. (2:33) Neither the U.N., the U.S. nor the Organization of African Unity has recognized the Republic of Somaliland. (11:165) When Somaliland's Acting President Hassan Essa Jama was asked about a southern government claiming all of Somalia he replied, "Somaliland's sovereignty is not negotiable. We will fight. We fought Siad Barre for ten years when people were saying he had the strongest military machine in black Africa. We armed Aidid and Ali Mahdi. We will beat the shit out of them. Print that. It will be war." (11:165) One could assume that the remarks above will apply to UNOSOM II as well.

Indeed, UNOSOM II did not get off to a very auspicious start. It's build up of forces did not proceed as planned, with over 7,000 troops (approximately 4,000 promised from India) not showing up. (21:25) UNOSOM II received a beating in early June 1993 at the hands of General Aidid, whose forces blatantly ambushed a detachment of Pakistani peacekeepers. (21:25) General Aidid's increasingly violent and disruptive activities have slowly expanded the focus of UNOSOM II's operations from those outlined in UNSCR 814 to include a manhunt for his capture.



## CHAPTER V

### GENERAL AIDID

The former Ambassador to Somalia Robert Oakley, appointed the U.S. special envoy to Somalia, arrived in Baidoa in early December, 1992, prior to the Marines arrival. There he met with the governor, Shareef Nur, and the provincial police chief, Mohamed Jemale. (19:25) Nur and Jemale are lieutenants of the now preeminent warlord in Somalia, Mohammed Farah Aidid. Ambassador Oakley came under intense criticism from the relief organizations for meeting with these "officials" as they are alleged to be responsible for the majority of the looting of relief convoys and warehouses in the Baidoa area. (19:25) CARE International's Baidoa director, Lockton Morrissey, stated:

It is absolutely made to legitimize these people. The Americans are being very naive politically. These men have been some of the nastiest characters in this holocaust--they are responsible for what has happened and now, overnight, they have been recognized as bona fide officials. (19:25)

Lockton Morrissey and the people from CARE "hosted" my first visit to Baidoa in November, 1992. Everything Lockton said was true; however, if you choose not to disarm the factions with the guns, neither can you safely ignore them because they will not ignore you. And indeed, they did not. The man with arguably the most guns, at least in that region of Somalia (including Mogadishu), is Aidid.

General Aidid is from the Habar Gidir branch of the Hawiye clan and a leader of the United Somali Congress, one of the multiple factions vying for power. (19:26) His power base is the traditional Hawiye clan holding of Mogadishu. (20:50) Considered the warlord of South Mogadishu, he contests control of the city with rival warlord Ali Mahdi Mohamed, from the Abgaal branch of the Hawiye clan. (11:162) Aidid's most significant rival outside Mogadishu is Kenyan-supplied Mohammed Siad Hersi Morgan, the son-in-law of deposed (and sometimes U.S. backed) Somali President Siad Barre, whose regime was particularly lethal to the Hawiye clan. (9:51; 11:164) Aidid fought bitterly against the Barre government and forces prior to its fall. (11:164) One of the legacies of that fighting is the intense distrust and hatred Aidid harbors for U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who, as Egyptian Foreign Minister, supported the Siad Barre regime. (11:164; 20:50) It is with this perspective that Aidid interacts with the U.N. and U.S. relief forces.

General Aidid continued his efforts to frustrate and disrupt any attempts at political reconciliations or compromise, bringing him more and more into the spotlight of the coalition leadership's attention and ire. Aidid boycotted, at least temporarily, the U.N. cease-fire talks in Addis Ababa. (11:164) He saw his way clear to go to the meeting only after a force of U.S. Marines leveled one of his military compounds. (11:164) A truce between Aidid and Ali Mahdi brokered by the U.S. for President Bush's visit to

Mogadishu prompted a firefight the first night that killed seventeen. (11:164) Boutros-Ghali's attempt to visit his U.N. staff in Mogadishu in January resulted in a 400-strong mob of Aidid supporters throwing rocks and garbage at the U.N. compound forcing the cancelation of the visit. (20:50) In February, 1993 a major flare up in the southern port of Kismayu between Morgan and Colonel Omar Jess, an Aidid ally, delayed the planned departure of U.S. troops from that area. (12:136) For the next two days Mogadishu was paralyzed with anti-foreigner demonstrations and rioting after Aidid, in a radio broadcast, accused the relief forces of siding with Morgan. In fact, the coalition forces had given Morgan an ultimatum to either withdraw his forces from the Kismayu area or be attacked. (12:136) Aidid, demonstrating complete control of his supporters, terminated the rioting by calling for calm over loudspeakers. (12:136) Again in March he provoked three days of anti-American riots in Mogadishu by broadcasting over his radio station that the foreigners were trying to put Siad Barre back in power. (24:14) The closer U.S. forces got to their scheduled 1 May departure and swapout with U.N. troops the more bold Aidid became. (12:136) The issue of a U.N. warrant for Aidid's arrest came after the early June ambush, slaughter and, in some cases, mutilation of 23 Pakistani U.N. troops. (21:25; 31:14) Clearly the humanitarian mission had taken a distinct turn away from its beginnings and any hopes of nation-rebuilding in Somalia had been severely delayed. The impact on U.N. freedom of

operations was so significant the U.N. Special Representative to Somalia, Admiral Jonathan Howe, stated that Aidid's capture was critical to getting the U.N. effort back on track. (31:18) He also allowed it would be virtually impossible for any other Somali political leader to emerge until Aidid is captured. (31:18)

## CHAPTER VI

### SOMALI NATIONAL IDENTITY

In his book *National Identity*, Anthony Smith defined a nation as, "...a named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members." (8:14) An additional significant factor in national identity is a common language. (5:23) This collective (national) identity will incorporate other types of identity such as ethnic, religious, ideology or class. (8:14)

The Somali are the largest ethnically pure group in Africa. (6:16) The population of Somalia is 98.8% Somali. (3:1168) Additionally, ethnic Somali's make up significant percentages of the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, the Northern Frontier District of Kenya and 43% of the population of Djibouti. (1:xxii; 6:6) These three regions plus British Somaliland (now northern Somalia) and Italian Somaliland (now southern Somalia) make up the five points of the star on the Somali flag. (4:258; 6:6) The Somali language has different

dialects but the differences do not prevent understanding.

(5:21,24) Somali's all (99%) practice Islam (primarily Sunni) to some degree. (3:1168; 5:25) Archeological evidence shows the Somali people may have occupied the Horn of Africa as early as the first century A. D. (1:xxi) Thus, in Somalia you have a highly developed sense of place, history, religion and culture resulting in a vehemently held national identity which is somewhat unique among post-colonial African nations. (2:4) This definition treats national identity as distinct and separate from the definition of nation-state. (8:14)

#### CULTURAL CHALLENGES TO NATION BUILDING

The Somali have a strong national identity but perhaps nothing stands in the way of their building a viable modern state more than the intricacies of Somali culture. (1:xxiv; 2:9-10)

The introduction to the Somalia country study book reads, "Historically, Somalis have shown fierce independence, an unwillingness to submit to authority, a strong clan consciousness, and conflict among clans and subclans despite their sharing a common language, religion, and pastoral customs." (1:xxi) Somali society is divided into six major clans. Four clans of pastoral nomads--the Daarood, Dir, Isaaq and Hawiye--comprise the largest segment of Somali society, representing about 70 percent of the population. The remaining two clans, the Digil and Rahanwayn, are agricultural and represent around 20 percent of the people. Each clan is divided into multiple subclans. (1:xxi; 2:9) (See Figure 1).

Thus, the most pervasive cultural challenge to the emergence of a modern nation-state in Somalia is the essence of Somali culture itself, the clan structure.

DAAROOD	ISAAQ	HAWIYE	DIR
OGADEN	HABAR YOONIS	HABAR GIDIR	GADABURSI
MAJEERTEEN	HABAR AWAL	ABGAAL	IISE
MAREEHAAN	HABAR TOLJAALO	BIYAMAAL	
DULBAHANTE	HABAR JAALO	HAWAADLE	
WARSANGALI	IIDAGALE	MURURSADE	
YUUSUF		UJUURAAN	
KABLALAH			
RAHANWAYN and DIGIL CLANS HAVE NO SUBCLANS			

FIGURE 1: MAJOR CLANS & SUBCLANS (1:72)

Closely related with the clan structure, indeed reinforcing it, is the tradition of lineage segmentation. (1:93; 4:17; 29:16)

Said Samatar from the History Department of Rutgers University commented, "The abiding predicament that makes Somali society all but ungovernable is what anthropologists call lineage segmentation." (29:16) He went on to explain:

In lineage segmentation, one does not have a permanent enemy or a permanent friend. Depending on a given context, a man may be your friend or foe. Everything is fluid and ever-changing. Segmentation, in other words, is a social system that results in and sanctions structural precariousness as a norm. Social relations in the community are so arranged as to institutionalize instability.

The shifting and ephemeral clan alliances in today's murderous civil war are an extreme manifestation of behavior inherent in Somali society....

Lineage segmentation produces a society of extreme individualism, in which each man is his own

sultan with no one endowed, legally or morally, to exercise centralized national authority....anarchic factionalism is in fact endemic in Somali society. (29:16)

When the aggressive and warlike temperament of the Somalis is factored into the equation it makes being an outsider or even a neighboring country a delicate proposition. (1:xxi; 6:18)

Another barrier to nation-building in Somalia is that the culture has bred a resentment of any form of national government. (5:61) Until the Horn was parceled off and colonized, Somalia never had an institutionalized government other than the authority of the elders. (5:61) Both the colonial governments and former Somali President Siad Barre's violent form of Somali socialism ran counter to and interfered with the traditional ways. (2:16; 6:25-26)

A third obstacle to any nation-building effort is that of religion. Nothing will unite (temporarily, remember lineage segmentation) the clans faster than the opportunity to resist an "infidel" intrusion into Somali ethnic territory and business. (2:16; 5:62) While predominately Sunni Muslim, the Somali nomad's religious practices have been influenced by Sufism (Muslim mysticism). (6:21) This can incorporate religious revivalism under a charismatic leader which can lead to *jihad*, or a religious crusade. (2:16)

Somalia has been referred to as a nation of poets. (29:16) The reason for this is Somali has been an oral language until 1972 when an arbitrary Roman script was adopted by the Barre government. (2:1; 5:21) This has resulted in

oral traditions and histories that concentrate on genealogical lineages and the social and political alliances that grouping has made in the past. (4:38) The net result is there are very few Somali speakers other than the Somalis themselves.

The final cultural dilemma facing a nation-building effort in Somalia is that the Somalis are predominantly pastoral nomads. (1:xxi) As Lee Cassanelli asks in *The Shaping of Somali Society*, "How...does a government create an agriculturally self-sufficient society from a nation of nomads...? How can it sedentarize a population for whom regional mobility is an ingrained way of life?" (4:261) How does a government deal with education when 70 percent of the population is pastoral. The previous government made a futile effort to develop an education system for the nomads. (7:6)

If nation-building is an objective in Somalia, an assessment of these cultural challenges will have to determine whether, and if so, how they can be surmounted or incorporated into a solution.

## CHAPTER VII

### CONCLUSIONS

This leaves two significant questions to be asked. First, is it possible to reconstruct a nation-state in Somalia? The overall assessment is that the breakdown of Somali civil society is so extensive that it might take years to build even the most basic political consensus. (10:29) Ambassador Hempstone noted, "I have heard estimates, and I do



not feel they are unreasonable, that it will take five years to get Somalia not on its feet but just on its knees." (10:30)

Historically, the three institutions of Somali culture that attempted to balance out the chaos of segmentation were the elders, the impact of poetry and music (remember this is a society with only an oral language), and the social contract of *heer*. (29:16) Professor Said Samatar explains:

The institution of elders gave the society a body of impartial arbitrators and conflict resolvers--the so-called *heerbeegti*, or legal experts that mediated disputes and regulated both intra- and inter-clan conflicts. Poetry moves the Somalis in some inexplicable primeval ways, alternately inflaming or inspiring them for good or ill. The principle of *heer* traditionally served as a constitution to assign, evaluate, and regulate punishment and rewards. *Heer* was the main instrument by which the elders governed society. (29:17)

Both colonial intervention and Somalia's bout with socialism under Barre destroyed those institutions. (29:17) Professor Samatar recommended that some of these be revived. First and foremost would be to revive the institution of the elders. Unfortunately, the only foreseeable way to do that is to disarm and minimize the influence of the warlords. They have been given quasi-legitimacy by the U.S. and U.N. negotiating with them when they are, in fact, the main and continuing source of the problem. (11:164; 17:22; 19:26; 29:17) Secondly, a neutral radio station should be established. News and hearsay are valuable commodities in an oral tradition society. This would also provide a forum for their beloved poets and musicians. Third, a program to help

repatriate the educated elite back to Somalia would be needed. Samatar estimates that over 90 percent of college-educated Somalis are outside the country. (29:17) Finally, after the warlords and clan militia are dissolved, begin recruiting a national police force with the intent to eventually have it commanded by the elders. (29:17)

While this does not address the full political, economic and regional problems in Somalia, it, at least according to Professor Samatar, provides a place to start that may be somewhat acceptable to the fractious Somali culture.

The second question to be asked is why did the U.N. and U.S. develop such divergent objectives? That is a matter of each one's perspective--their self-interest in relationship to the problem.

First, from the U.N. perspective, the Secretary-General has to be concerned that a perceived failure of the U.N. effort in Somalia may impinge on the ability of the U.N. to engage in humanitarian situations requiring similar levels of effort. Superpower participation, and success, is key for him keeping smaller states engaged and willing to provide forces for U.N. missions of this type. If the superpower fails, why should the less wealthy and well-equipped nations even attempt it? Secondly, the Secretary-General has to be concerned with the massive refugee problem affecting the nations of the region. Large numbers of refugees create a destabilizing influence, particularly if their basic needs cannot be met. This is especially true in a region already plagued with

stability problems. Finally, the Secretary-General's only viable alternative is to attempt to rebuild Somalia as a nation-state so it may begin to assist in resolving some of the problems its dissolution created.

How did Boutros Boutros-Ghali so thoroughly misread U.S. intentions? As Ambassador Oakley remarked, "We kept telling Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali we were leaving, but he wouldn't take it seriously." (21:25) It appears that he overestimated his ability to influence U.S. action, perhaps thinking that once U.S. forces were in Somalia he would be able to coerce an extended stay and expanded mission, namely disarming Somalia. While he did accomplish this to some degree, it was not at the level he desired nor for the purpose he planned. This is proving to be an expensive error in judgment. This error resulted in a U.N. coalition force facing significantly armed Somali factions instead of the somewhat pacified situation he had envisioned.

Edward Luttwak from the Center for Strategic and International Studies is highly critical of U.N. force coalitions, assessing the forces provided by the member nations as being, "...good, bad or indifferent...usually under strict no-casualty rules that guarantee their uselessness...." (17:23) Although that harsh assessment may not apply in some circumstances, the U.N. may have to sanction a more aggressive approach to dealing with situations where the veneer of any civilization whatsoever has been stripped away. If the member nation contingents are not willing to commit and use combat

forces when necessary, perhaps the U.N. needs to recruit, train, and equip it's own core force to use as a mainstay in peacemaking operations. (17:23) Additionally, the U.N. and its members that assign forces to these coalition efforts must commit to a command and control structure that integrates these disparate national contingents into at least a semi-homogeneous unit if they are to have the desired effectiveness in operations like Somalia.

The Secretary-General, Professor Samatar and even some of the relief organizations are implying that, if necessary, force should be used to essentially disarm the Somali population as an initial step in the rebuilding process. More specifically, they want the U.S. to do it. General Hoar explicitly rejected that mission as it held the potential for house-to-house searches and, by inference, house-to-house combat. With the objective of humanitarian relief, house to house combat would require too great a cost--it would not balance against the national interest.

The U.S. has articulated few, if any, long-term national interests or objectives in the Horn of Africa. Its response to Somalia is likely based, at least in part, on the following factors: first, a "You're the Superpower, do something" mentality that, right or wrong, seems to generate the need to respond by some areas of the media and government; second, some culpability for the arms influx into the area during the Cold War surrogate confrontations; third, the need to respond to escalating media coverage; and finally, a genuine desire to

be helpful in humanitarian situations. Given these parameters, as well as the national penchant for a quick fix with light or no casualties, it follows that a short-term airlift of humanitarian supplies followed by an armed escort and protection service until the long-term forces of the U.N. take over makes some sense for the U.S. as an acceptable national objective for the intervention into Somalia.

We are not prepared, however, militarily (proper resources and training for this type of mission), nationally (with a strategy and stated objectives), or mentally (a perceived national interest) for the long-term humanitarian and particularly the nation-building requirements of this type of operation. (30:61) William Taylor of the Center for Strategic and International Studies noted that the U.S. has neither, "the force structure, doctrine or training to perform peacekeeping or "peacemaking" operations." (18:23) Nonetheless, if we are to continue to be tasked with peacekeeping, peacemaking and long-term nation-building roles, we will have to develop the doctrine and train and equip forces as equally suited for this type of employment as they are for their traditional military roles.

The challenge to U.S. national leadership is far greater and more complex, particularly in view of the shrinking resources of force structure and budget. That challenge is to determine which objectives of national interest warrant the application of these resources. (30:61) Jean Kirkpatrick put this challenge to President Clinton, "...to distinguish

between what can be accomplished through global institutions, what can be done unilaterally, and what cannot be done at all." (15:10A) A key point regarding interventions is to define what national interest is served. If the intervention will be long or casualties heavy, public opinion, in any society, will not endure such activity if no national interest is involved. (13:11) Better definition of objectives and interests may prevent the following from becoming prophetic, "Perhaps "Somalian intervention" is destined to become as proverbial as a Carthaginian peace or a Pyrrhic victory." (17:22)

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